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In this article, I discuss studies in complexity and its epistemological implications for systematic 
and practical theology. I argue that engagement with complexity does not necessarily assure 
a non-reductionist approach. However, if complexity is engaged transversally, it becomes 
possible to transcend reductionist approaches. Moreover, systematic and practical theologians 
can draw on complexity in developing new ways of understanding and, therefore, new ways 
of describing the focus, epistemic scope and heuristic structures of systematic and practical 
theology. Firstly, Edgar Morin draws a distinction between restricted and general complexity 
based on the epistemology drawn upon in studies in complexity. Moving away from 
foundationalist approaches to epistemology, Morin argues for a paradigm of systems. Secondly, 
I discuss Kees van Kooten Niekerk’s distinction between epistemology, methodology and 
ontology in studies in complexity and offer an example of a theological argument that draws 
on complexity. Thirdly, I argue for the importance of transversality in engaging complexity by 
drawing on the work of Wentzel van Huyssteen and Paul Cilliers. In conclusion, I argue that 
theologians have to be conscious of the epistemic foundations of each study in complexity, and 
these studies illuminate the heart of Reformed theology.
Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: Therefore, this article has both 
intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary implications. When theologians engage studies in 
complexity, the epistemological roots of these studies need to be considered seeing that 
researchers in complexity draw on different epistemologies. Drawing on transversality would 
enhance such considerations. Furthermore, Edgar Morin’s and Paul Cilliers’ approach to 
complexity will inform practical and theoretical considerations in church polity and unity.
Introduction
During the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the theory of complexity and its 
implications for how we understand an engage reality. A wide variety of researchers from diverse 
fields engage complexity studies, making complexity studies valuable in facilitating trans and 
interdisciplinary research. However, whilst studies in complexity are valuable in facilitating trans 
and interdisciplinary research, there are some difficulties regarding the way in which researchers 
within different disciplines draw on complexity. This is partly due to the absence of a theory of 
complexity. There is no unified theory of complexity that is embedded in a single epistemology, 
and this leads to the variety of ways in which researchers draw on complexity. By drawing on 
the work of Edgar Morin, Paul Cilliers, Wentzel van Huyssteen, Kees van Kooten Niekerk and 
Hans Buhl, I argue that even though there is no single theory of complexity, one can make a 
distinction between the different ways in which researchers draw on complexity with regard to 
foundationalist and non-foundationalist epistemologies.
Restricted and general complexity
As stated above, there is no single theory of complexity.1 Edgar Morin, however, argues that one 
can make a distinction between restricted and general approaches to complexity. To understand 
this distinction, it is necessary to look at the development of studies in complexity.
Kees van Kooten Niekerk and Hans Buhl trace the origin of the sciences of complexity2 back to 
the non-reductionist approaches of the 1930s (Van Kooten Niekerk & Buhl 2004:4). In the 
1930s, Ludwig von Bertalanffy introduced the term systems theory in opposition to reductionist 
descriptions of biological phenomena. This opposition to reductive descriptions is still 
1.Chu, Strand and Fjelland (2003:20) explains that, although ‘the early successes of complexity research have indeed invoked a 
widespread belief into the viability of a Theory of Complexity, today many prominent proponents of the science of complexity seem to 
have reduced their expectations and also doubt the absolute need of a Theory of Complexity. Their point of view seems to be that the 
science of complexity can still be productive even if it does not possess a rigorous overarching theory’.
2.Here I use the phrase sciences of complexity which should be distinguished from the phrase complexity studies. This distinction will 
become clear in the distinction between restricted complexity and general complexity. The phrase the sciences of complexity is used 
within restricted complexity, and complexity studies is used in general complexity. 
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one of the main driving forces in complexity studies. 
Another important aspect of complexity studies, namely 
self-organisation, became prominent with the work of Ilya 
Prigogine who succeeded in describing dissipative systems 
mathematically by using nonlinear differential equations 
(Van Kooten Niekerk & Buhl 2004:4). This meant that small 
changes in a system may have a large effect on the system. 
In the 1960s, Edward Lorenz used nonlinear differential 
equations to simulate weather patterns, and his research 
initiated the mathematical investigation of chaos, or chaos 
theory (Van Kooten Niekerk & Buhl 2004:5). According to 
Kees van Kooten Niekerk and Hans Buhl, a hallmark of 
the sciences of complexity is its use of computer modelling 
to simulate and understand complex systems. As such, the 
development of the sciences of complexity is closely related 
to the development of the computer. They refer to the work 
of John Conway on cellular automata, Per Bak’s research of 
self-organised criticality and Stuart Kauffman’s use of computer 
simulations in investigating the origin and evolution of life 
(Van Kooten Niekerk & Buhl 2004:5–8). What is important 
here is that the sciences of complexity originated from, and 
developed within, diverse research projects and not from a 
single theory of complexity.3 Furthermore, one of the driving 
forces behind the study of complexity is its non-reductionist 
argument. It is exactly here where the work of Edgar 
Morin and Paul Cilliers sheds light on complexity studies. 
Morin (1992) writes:
In contrast with the idea of a general theory of systems (or even 
a theory specific to systems), I wish ... to propose the idea of a 
systems paradigm capable of informing all theories, whatever 
their field of application or the phenomena in question. (p. 371)
Morin (1992:372) makes this suggestion because ‘holism arises 
from the same simplifying principle as the reductionism to 
which it is opposed’. Morin argues that holism or a focus 
on the whole is a simplification or reduction to the whole. 
When researchers focus on the macro-unity of the system 
and ignore the parts or the micro, they are still busy with 
a reductive activity. In Morin’s view, complexity studies 
have to be able to describe a complex system by holding the 
micro and macro together because the parts have a double 
identity – one that is individual and one that is common 
(Morin 1992:373). In other words, the characteristics of 
the parts and their interaction with each other are just as 
important as the system that develops from the interaction of 
the parts. Complexity cannot be simplified, and we need to 
unite ideas which seem mutually exclusive in the framework 
of reduction (Morin 1992:381). Morin (1992) writes:
We begin to catch a glimpse of a new form of rationality. The old 
rationality was content to fish for order in the sea of nature. But 
it caught no fish – only fish bones! By allowing us to conceive 
of organization and existence, the new rationality allows us to 
perceive not only the fish, but the ocean as well – that is to say, 
that which can never be caught. (p. 383)
It is Morin’s desire to break with reductionist activity all 
together. This leads him to make a distinction between 
restricted complexity and general complexity. He argues that 
3.Important to note is that systems theory also drew upon a number of different 
theories, including information theory and cybernetics (Van Kooten Niekerk & 
Buhl 2004:4).
classical science draws on three fundamental explanatory 
principles: (1) the principle of universal determinism which 
allows prediction, (2) the principle of reduction which allows 
simplification and (3) the principle of disjunction which 
allows isolating and separating knowledge and disciplines 
(Morin 2007:5).4 The epistemology and principles of classical 
science is still active when researchers are searching for the 
laws of complexity (Morin 2007:10). A system is simplified to sets 
of laws and universal truths which operate as the foundation 
of the sciences of complexity (Human & Cilliers 2013:31). 
This is what Morin calls restricted complexity, and it is usually 
‘those approaches to complexity which developed from 
chaos theory and fractal mathematics’ (Cilliers 2008:42). 
Researchers err when they think that they can find a method 
in complexity that can be applied automatically to the world 
(Morin 2007:28). Cilliers (2008) writes:
The problem is, however, severely compounded when the 
methods of the natural sciences are imposed upon, or, even 
worse, embraced in a simplistic way by the social sciences and 
humanities. The impression is then created that a traditional 
understanding of truth, which is problematic even in natural 
science, should form the criterion for proper work in social 
science. (p. 53)
In disagreement with the epistemology and principles of 
classical science, researchers in general complexity draw on 
different principles:
•	 a principle that conceives a relation between order, 
disorder and organisation where order does not only 
mean laws but also stability and regularities, and disorder 
also means collisions and irregularities
•	 a principle that conceives the relation of whole-part 
implication
•	 a principle that maintains the distinction but that tries to 
establish the relation (Morin 2007:10–11).5
Researchers in general complexity draw on an epistemology 
that rethinks the epistemology of classical science 
(Cilliers 2008:42). Human and Cilliers (2013:32) explain 
that ‘… general complexity point towards an epistemology 
of complex systems which examines the relationships between 
the parts as well as the parts themselves’. Preiser (2010:66) 
underscores this when she explains that the art of complexity 
thinking does not lie in describing opposites but in thinking 
both. One should not describe one thing in terms of the other 
but rather how the one is dependent on and determined by 
the other.
4.Robert Delorme explains that Morin argues against the separating of disciplines in 
classical science. Delorme (2010:246–247) explains that classical science ‘generated 
a paradigm of simplification which has had great success but which also had 
mutilating consequences through excluding from scientific enquiry the features that 
could not be grasped by the paradigm and through setting rigid barriers between 
disciplines. Morin searches for a strategy of knowledge that would enable one to 
grasp or to create an articulation between sciences’.
5.Wentzel van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist epistemology links well with Morin’s 
general complexity. Van Huyssteen argues for a postfoundationalist approach 
as a viable third option beyond foundationalism and nonfoundationalism. Van 
Huyssteen (1999:113) explains that a postfoundationalist approach ‘should free us 
to approach our cross-disciplinary conversation with our strong beliefs and even 
prejudices intact, and while acknowledging these strong commitments, to identify 
at the same time the shared resources of human rationality in different modes of 
reflection ... a truly postfoundational move beyond objectivism and relativism is 
to rediscover the embeddedness of our rational reflection in the context of living, 
evolving and developing traditions’.
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Researchers in general complexity recognise that it is necessary 
to reduce and constrain but understand that these reductions 
are provisional and subject to the observer (Human & 
Cilliers 2013:32). To gain knowledge from a complex system, 
the system has to be modelled, and the model represents an 
interpretation of the system which will always be reductive 
(Cilliers 2007:83). Explaining this statement, Cilliers draws a 
distinction between knowledge and information. He explains 
that knowledge should be reserved for information that is 
situated historically and contextually by a knowing subject 
(Cilliers 2007:85). However, for knowledge to exist, we have 
to place limits on the information, which means that the 
complexity of a system needs to be reduced or interpreted 
in order to gain an understanding of it (Cilliers 2007:86). 
Thus, it is necessary to identify the boundaries of the system 
(Cilliers 2007:86), but these boundaries are simultaneously a 
function of the activity of the system and a product of the 
descriptive strategy (Cilliers 2008:47). We have to make 
certain modelling choices when describing phenomena 
because we cannot have complete knowledge of complex 
things (Woermann & Cilliers 2012:404). We have to interpret, 
and our interpretation is developed in terms of the aims of 
our description (Cilliers 2000:46). However, the choice of 
models is not arbitrary because some models work better 
than others, but we cannot claim that this choice is an 
objective one (Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers 2008:218). Models are 
necessary but always involve decisions and values.
Epistemology, methodology, 
ontology and complexity
In their book, Kees van Kooten Niekerk and Hans Buhl (2004) 
distinguish between the epistemological, methodological 
and ontological aspects of the study of complexity that 
have an impact on theological research. When we describe 
a system in terms of complexity, are we only describing our 
understanding of the system in terms of complexity, or is 
the system itself really complex (Van Kooten Niekerk & 
Buhl 2004:11)? The distinction between epistemological and 
ontological complexity is very important because it has a 
far-reaching impact on the status of our knowledge. This 
distinction is of the utmost importance when theologians 
draw on complexity. Complexity studies also have 
methodological significance for understanding systems 
because it illuminates the way in which researchers interact 
with the system that is being studied and offers a variety 
of ways in which a system can be modelled (Van Kooten 
Niekerk & Buhl 2004:11). It is exactly the methodological 
implications and applications of complexity that have made 
it so interesting and useful in trans and interdisciplinary 
research. The appropriateness of these different uses is still 
a point of discussion, but the methodological implications 
of complexity have been applied in numerous fields. Many 
theologians, however, focus on the epistemological and 
ontological implications of complexity and do not take note 
of the significance of the methodological implications of 
complexity.
Theologians drawing on complexity
By recognising that the purpose for an argument shapes 
the argument itself and by identifying whether the 
theologian is developing an epistemological, methodological 
or ontological argument, it is possible to offer a description 
of the way in which theologians draw on complexity in their 
research.
One of the earliest contributions to theological discourse 
on complexity is the edited volume Chaos and complexity: 
Scientific perspectives on divine action (Russel, Murphy & 
Peacocke 1995). In this volume, the authors discuss a variety 
of themes linked with theological discourse on complexity. 
They discuss chaos, divine action, reductionism, 
emergence, downward causation, boundary conditions, 
self-organisation, thermodynamics, God, trinity, language, 
God-world relation, Trinitarian approaches, systems 
theory, top-down causation, quantum theory, causal gaps 
and bottom-up causation. The volume as a whole covers the 
epistemological, methodological and ontological aspects of 
complexity. However, important to note is that this volume 
grew out of a conference at Vatican City, and the editors 
(Russel et al. 1995) describe the purpose of the conference 
as follows:
The purpose of the conference was to explore the implications 
of chaos and complexity in physical, chemical, and biological 
systems for philosophical and theological issues surrounding 
the topic of divine action. (p. 1)
The link between chaos and complexity and the intent to explore 
the implications of complexity in the natural sciences for use 
in the humanities indicate that some of these discussions are 
dealing with restricted complexity.
Gregersen discusses two ways in which theologians can 
draw insight from the sciences of complexity. The first is 
focused on how the science of complexity may affect religious 
self-understanding, and the second is how theologians 
may appropriate insight from the sciences of complexity 
in theological terms (Gregersen 2004:153). Gregersen 
(2004:153–154) mentions some of the fruitful areas of contact 
between theology and the sciences of complexity:
•	 The worldview of the sciences is shifting from the world 
as a mechanical clock to a cluster of networks. This opens 
new avenues of conversation between theology and 
the science.
•	 The idea of self-organisation gives priority to the 
theological idea of continuous creation.
•	 Divine action does not need to contradict natural laws 
because there are no pre-ordained laws to break.
•	 Instead of focusing on individual genes in Neo-
Darwinism, the importance of interconnected living 
organisms is accentuated, which is closer to ethical and 
religious sentiments.
However, Gregersen’s (2004:143) description of complexity 
is still shaped by restricted complexity because he explains 
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that the ‘… aim of complexity research is to uncover the 
simple rules that generate the complex patterns of behaviour of 
natural phenomena. Simplicity often underlies complexity’. 
It is exactly these simple rules that are used in computer 
modelling6 and whilst computer modelling has been useful 
in some cases, by its nature, computer modelling is a very 
reductive activity.
Approaching complexity differently, there are theologians 
who draw on epistemologies and rationalities that are similar to 
what Morin has phrased a paradigm of systems (or a paradigm 
of complexity).7 In his article, Günter (2004:173) draws 
on complexity, epistemologically and methodologically, 
and argues that different theologies could be understood 
as different reductions or models of a multi-referential 
endeavour. By describing different theologies as different 
models, it is possible to identify models of theology that 
are reductive. Here one may identify certain feministic, 
liberation, African and biblical theologies that reduce 
theology to a simple underlying principle or critic. Some of 
these theologies offer a reductionist description of theology 
because they offer a description that is shaped by only one 
aspect of the system.
The work of Welker also finds its epistemology and 
rationality in what Morin calls the paradigm of complexity. 
Welker (1994:26) explains that human beings find it difficult 
to tolerate social complexity. We are constantly looking 
for a connecting link that is common to all. Therefore we 
use phrases such as ‘the’ human person and ‘the’ threat to 
humanity. Welker (1994) writes:
With the minimum of theological instinct, theologies and church 
leaders have, on the basis of a simplistic understanding of ‘unity’ 
(e.g., monohierarchical unity), condemned pluralism as if it were 
a unitary phenomenon. In so doing they have demonstrated 
an absence of the power to distinguish between individually 
disintegrative pluralism and the life-enhancing, invigorating 
pluralism of the Spirit. (p. 27)
His critique against simplification and his insistence on 
the necessity of plurality shows that he is working in 
general complexity. This approach can also be seen in other 
areas of his work. In reflecting on anthropology, Welker 
(2012:38) argues that both the macro-anthropological 
and micro-anthropological approaches are crucial for a 
circumspect analysis. We have to reflect on the whole as 
well as the parts. The work of Dirk Smit is also embedded 
in general complexity. In a series of articles written in the 
1980s, Smit discusses different ways in which spirituality 
can be modelled (Smit 1989:88–92). However, he makes it 
clear that not one of these models is sufficient on its own. We 
6.Gregersen (2000:60) writes: ‘Complex phenomena such as life and social systems 
cannot be handled with a step-by-step causal analysis; these systems are much 
too large … for a precise explanation in terms of its constitutive components. What 
we can do, however, is make more simplistic computer simulations of the complex 
realities …’ Morin and Cilliers admit that we need to reduce the system in order to 
understand it, but this reductive activity should not be seen as the aim of the study 
of complexity. This is why Morin suggests a paradigm of complexity with a rationality 
that can distinguish and connect knowledge, rather than define and separate. 
7.Kuhn, Woog and Salner (2011:263) also emphasize this approach when they explain 
that they ‘… seek to go beyond focusing on complexity per se, to using complexity 
as a heuristic device for developing cognitive agility’. 
need to keep all these different models in mind when dealing 
with spirituality (Smit 1989:92). The question now becomes 
how researchers can keep different models together whilst 
reflecting on the whole and the parts. I propose that the work 
of Paul Cilliers and Wentzel van Huyssteen can illuminate 
such an approach.
Complexity, interdisciplinarity and 
transversality
Instead of searching for simple and universal underlying 
principles or laws in complex systems, Cilliers argues that it 
is better to deal with each system on its own terms. Therefore, 
he (Cilliers 2008:45–46) offers 12 characteristics that might 
be found in complex systems.8 Complex systems are open 
systems that are constituted by a large variety of parts that 
interacted with each other in a dynamic and nonlinear way. 
These characteristics of complex systems are generated within 
complexity studies, but complexity studies is not a discipline 
with a focus, experiential scope and heuristic structures. 
Complexity studies could be described as an interdisciplinary 
conversation regarding the transversal issue of complexity. 
As such, the characteristics of complex systems offered by 
Cilliers are gained within a transversal conversation. These 
characteristics can then be included in the focus, experiential 
scope and heuristic structures of a particular discipline as are 
appropriate.9 However, one cannot describe the complexity 
of a biological system in the same way as one would describe 
the complexity of mental systems. Such epistemic shortcuts 
would imply a foundationalist epistemology. John Mingers 
(2008) puts it as follows:
Because systems thinking can be applied across the disciplines 
it has often been the case that systems ideas have been applied 
to a particular domain by people who are not themselves expert 
in that area. The result of this is often weak and superficial, and 
contributes to a poor reputation for systems. It is much better 
when people who are already expert in their own discipline use 
systems concepts to develop their own ideas. (p. 257)
In his book, Cilliers (1998) draws on the characteristics of 
complex systems generated within a transversal space when 
he proposes that postmodern society can be understood 
in terms of complexity. He does not apply or use the same 
approach to complexity as used in biology or economics. 
Cilliers appropriates the characteristics of complex systems 
for philosophy with the intent of describing postmodern 
society in terms of complexity. By including these 
appropriated characteristics of complexity to the focus, 
experiential scope and heuristic structures of philosophy, 
Cilliers illuminates the complexity of postmodern society 
within the context of philosophy, thereby safeguarding 
8.Chu et al. (2003:26–27) propose a similar approach when they use the phrase 
generators of complexity. They explain that ‘… the very existence of complex 
systems science shows that the over-simplification that we find in physics is of 
broad application, but by no means of universal application … to approximate the 
world as not contextual and nearly closed works in many cases, but not always …’ 
They propose that radical openness and contextuality are two of the generators of 
complexity (Chu et al. 2003:28). In order to break with the search for the laws of 
complexity, they propose that we should ‘… focus more on properties of complex 
systems, rather than the details of mechanism’ (Chu et al. 2003:29). 
9.Van Huyssteen (2006:75) explains that transversality makes it possible to discuss a 
transversal issue as well as to draw on criteria of different disciplines. However, this 
happens within the transversal space.
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the integrity of philosophy. Even though Cilliers does not 
explicitly describe this exercise as transversal, in terms of 
Van Huyssteen’s description of transversality, Cilliers does 
incorporate the characteristics of complexity in philosophy 
transversally.
Wentzel van Huyssteen explains that, through transversality, 
one acknowledges that, whilst disciplines are connected and 
intertwined in many ways, they do have their own integrity 
and identities. A transversal approach makes it possible to 
acknowledge the point of contact between disciplines without 
these disciplines merging into one (Van Huyssteen 2006:23). 
By applying the concept of transversality to his description 
of interdisciplinary facilitation, Van Huyssteen argues that 
a transversal approach makes it possible to move from one 
discourse to another whilst acknowledging contextuality.10 
A transversal approach is a fusion of epistemology and 
hermeneutics (Van Huyssteen 2006:22).11
In Figure 1, each cylinder represents a discipline, and viewed 
from the top, it looks as if the cylinders intersect. In Figure 2, 
we view the cylinders from the side and see that they do 
not intersect, but they all move though the transversal point. 
The illustration in Figure 2 shows that these disciplines 
do not intersect each other directly but explain different 
layers of a transversal issue due to the difference in their 
experiential scopes.12
It is important that the boundaries between disciplines are 
not blurred, because Van Huyssteen argues against the 
assimilation of different disciplines (Van Huyssteen 2006:19). 
Through a transversal approach, one does not intend to create 
a new multi-focused discipline. The intent of a transversal 
approach is to explore the point of contact between disciplines 
without compromising the integrity of the disciplines 
involved. Transversality makes it possible for scholars to 
discuss the shared point and then return to their respective 
disciplines. This lends itself to an appropriate and contextual 
incorporation of the insight generated within interdisciplinary 
research within the specific discipline. Researchers reflect 
on a transversal point from their discipline’s specific focus, 
experiential scope and heuristic structures. The intent of 
10.Montuori (2013:216) writes: ‘It is not surprising that Bateson, Jantsch, Maruyama, 
and Morin have all drawn extensively from General Systems Theory (GST) 
and Cybernetics. Both GST and Cybernetics emerged as attempts to develop 
a “transversal” language, a way of thinking that could move across disciplines 
and re-connect what had been torn asunder in disciplinary fragmentation.’ 
Montuori (2013:217) explains that transversal approaches stress the importance 
of context and the dangers of decontextualisation. It is exactly the danger of the 
decontextualisation of knowledge in complexity studies that is the focus of the 
present article. 
11.Schrag (1992:149) writes: ‘… certain tendencies in the employment of the 
vocabulary of transversality need to be resisted. Chief among these tendencies is 
the rationalistic impulse to sublate the several usages in the various disciplines into 
a higher concept that totalizes the different faculties of knowledge into a seamless 
unity viewed from above, as well as the positivistic impulse to determine a usage 
that is somehow paradigmatic and normative for all the rest, inviting a hegemonic 
unity of the sciences seen from below.’
12.Osmer (2008:172), a Princeton colleague of Van Huyssteen, distinguishes between 
correlational, transformational and transversal models of cross-disciplinary 
dialogue and comments: ‘Unlike the transformational approach, the transversal 
model presupposes a more fluid and dynamic understanding of the relationship 
between disciplines. Disciplines are not pictured as distinct language games but 
as networks that transverse one another and share the common resources of 
rationality. While this model has much in common with the correlation approach, 
it gives greater attention to the pluralism found in virtually every field today. In 
light of this pluralism, cross-disciplinary dialogue must become more concrete than 
is typically the case in correlation models.’
such a reflection is to unpack the different layers of each 
discipline’s knowledge of the transversal point and discuss 
the points of association and disassociation. However, the 
purpose of such a conversation is not to reach a consensus 
but to illuminate the different layers of a transversal point. 
The insights gained within this transversal conversation 
can then be taken back into each participating discipline and 
included as is appropriate for its focus, experiential scope 
and heuristic structures.
Additionally, through a transversal approach, one 
guards against scholars taking epistemic shortcuts 
(Van Huyssteen 1998:78). Epistemic shortcuts can be seen 
in many interdisciplinary encounters. The concept refers to 
an uncritical insertion of knowledge from one discipline to 
another. This can be seen when the insights of biologists on 
the complexity of biological systems are directly applied to 
social systems (cf. Van Huyssteen 1998:44–45). This means 
that, although social systems can be understood in terms 
Source: Author’s own construction 
FIGURE 1: Disciplines crossing viewed from above.
D
isciplines
3
2
1
Source: Author’s own construction 
FIGURE 2: Disciplines crossing transversal point viewed from the side.
Transversal 
point
1
2
3
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of complexity, we need to acknowledge that the working 
of a social system is different to that of an amoeba. Cilliers 
(2008:53) explains that the social scientists and scholars 
in the humanities cannot proceed in the same way as the 
natural scientists do.13 Scholars from different disciplines 
are encouraged to develop models that would generate 
understanding of that which they mean to understand. These 
models may be different, but the knowledge generated in 
these disciplines can then be brought into interdisciplinary 
reflection transversally (Van Huyssteen 1999:136).14 Materia 
and Baglio (2005) illuminate the impact of complexity studies 
on the health sciences in their short editorial ‘Health, science 
and complexity’. They explain that researchers in genetic 
epidemiology have realised that they underestimate the effect 
of environment and overestimated the effect of gene (Materia 
& Baglio 2005:534). They have also started to re-evaluate 
their models and taken into account the importance of 
context. Moreover, researchers in epidemiology no longer 
consider randomised controlled trails as the highest standard 
for all types of clinical questions because one universal study 
design is not necessarily suitable for all research objectives. 
Most interestingly, these researchers argue that qualitative 
research should be integrated into systematic reviews. Clearly, 
complexity has had an impact on epidemiology. What do 
these changes in epidemiology mean for research in theology? 
These changes have all been epistemological changes, which 
make it much easier to appropriate in theological research. 
The recognition of context is important. Theology is never 
developed in a cultural vacuum and therefore theologians 
have to recognise the influence of context on beliefs, faith 
and faith communities. This might entail re-evaluating our 
models of ethics, pastoral care, anthropology and God. 
Here, we might think of the atheistic movement as a critic 
of outdated models and a search for new ways in which 
to practice faith. However, whilst the epistemological 
changes in epidemiology can be appropriated for theological 
reflection, theology is a different system with a different 
history and different challenges. Therefore, theologians are 
encouraged to re-evaluate their epistemologies and develop 
theologies in ways that are appropriate for their context, but 
what these changes and re-evaluations might entail cannot 
be determined by another discipline or system.
Conclusion
Theologians, along with a wide variety of researchers from 
other fields, have drawn on complexity in many ways, and 
as such, the study of complexity has become a natural and 
widely influenced facilitator of interdisciplinarity. Morin’s 
distinction between restricted complexity and general 
complexity assists us in illuminating reductive uses of 
complexity in these fields of research. He suggests that 
13.Cilliers (2008:54) adds that social scientists and scholars in the humanities do 
not need to proceed in the same way as natural scientists do because general 
complexity argues against the superiority of the models and frameworks 
generated by natural scientists. This is a mistake made within the foundationalist 
epistemology of restricted complexity. 
14.Van Huyssteen (2008:518) explains: ‘Transversal reasoning ... is a pragmatic 
approach to the performative praxis of reason as we venture down the risky road 
of interdisciplinary dialogue. As such, it is not about arbitrarily opening ourselves 
up or closing ourselves off to other viewpoints. It is about discovering what it might 
mean to share an epistemic space that allows for the kind of interdisciplinary critical 
evaluation that includes a critical self-evaluation and optimal understanding.’ 
complexity also informs our epistemology and proposes 
a paradigm of complexity. In this paradigm, we should 
describe rationality itself differently, and acknowledging 
the knower in the process of inquiry changes the way we 
describe rationality. Montuori (2008) puts it eloquently:
With Morin we find the knower taking center stage and 
becoming a subject of inquiry, self-reflection and self-analysis. 
This opens up an entirely different understanding of the nature 
of inquiry, deepening the complexity and forcing the inquirer 
to take responsibility for his or her own process. Not unlike 
the process of training required for psychoanalysts, Morinian 
inquiry involves a recognition that all inquiry is engaged by a 
human being, not an objective lens with no emotions, stressors, 
political and social constraints, and so on. Inquiry therefore 
requires a process of self-inquiry.15 (pp. xxxix–xl)
Cilliers explains that, whilst there are no simple laws to 
complexity, there are characteristics of complexity that makes 
it possible for us to identify a system as complex and describe 
it according to its own constraints. Van Huyssteen explains 
that these characteristics could be appropriated in different 
research projects transversally, which will safeguard the 
integrity of each research field involved and open up new 
research avenues. It is through the work of these scholars 
that theologians can orientate themselves within this 
interdisciplinary conversation and draw on complexity. 
When theologians engage complexity in this way, we can 
generate knowledge from within theological research rather 
than importing knowledge from elsewhere.
For example, Osberg et al. (2008:218–219) explain that ‘… the 
only reason rules work in models is because models have 
well defined boundaries’. This is interesting when we 
should think of dogma as the rules and a specific theology 
as the model. The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) draws 
on a reformed model of theology and its rules or dogmas. 
During the last few years, there have been many discussions 
regarding homosexual clergy and the acceptance of the 
Belhar Confession. These two discussions are examples of 
two completely different discussions if we were to describe 
the Dutch Reformed Church as a complex system. The 
discussion regarding homosexual clergy is about rules of the 
system. These rules work very well when the boundaries of 
the church are well defined. However, when the boundaries 
of the church are open, less defined and allow for interaction 
with its environment, which it definitely does, these 
rules might become too reductionist. The church leaders 
should therefore recognise that their discussions regarding 
homosexual clergy are partly a modelling problem. Dogma 
can only be strictly adhered to in a closed model of church 
and society.
15.The inquirer is also very important in Van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist approach. 
Van Huyssteen (1999:152) explains that, ‘… as human beings, we are characterized 
by self-awareness, and our individual, personal motivations or reasons for 
believing, acting, and choosing are not only closely tied in with some sense of who 
this I is, but are indeed epistemically shaping the value judgments we make in 
terms of this self-conception’. Furthermore, Van Huyssteen (1999:144) proposes 
that ‘… learning to make the right or appropriate decisions, or solve certain 
problems, therefore involves the development of intellectual skills that are in many 
ways, analogous to physical skills’. Cilliers underscores this idea when he argues 
that ethics should be understood as something that constitutes our knowledge 
and us. Welker (1994:24) is also aware of the influence of his self-conception in his 
research when he explains that he ‘… must examine carefully the extent to which 
these boundaries influence and mark not only myself as a concrete individual, but 
also my general view and statements about “the individual,” “the person,” the 
good, the rational, the timely, indeed even what is “willed by God”’. 
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The acceptance of the Belhar Confession involves a re-
evaluation of the current model of theology on which the DRC 
draws. The Belhar Confession offers an interpretation of faith 
that would inevitably change the DRC’s model of theology. 
The question that is paramount for the DRC is whether or not 
the model of theology that they currently use is sufficient for 
the extremely complex society in which they practise their 
faith? Does the Belhar Confession help in developing a more 
appropriate model of theology for reformed Christians in 
South Africa? This is the same question that was asked of 
previous and already accepted confessions. All confessions 
offer an interpretation of faith within a specific context that 
assists in developing a model of theology. The work of the 
theologian is to continuously ask whether the model of 
theology upon which it draws is adequate for engaging the 
reality of faith. Osberg et al. (2008:224) explains that ‘… the 
system is never in a state where it is fully actualised, is never 
fully “present” at any point in time, because an integral part 
of it is that which is not part of it’. In this way, studies in 
complexity is not only a rich resource for theologians, but 
more than this, it illuminates the heart of Reformed theology.
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